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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sale situation, it is obvious that a taxpayer should not be able to affect
the character of his realized income merely by making a voluntary
election to defer the reporting of his gain. Where there is a tax-free
exchange, the deferment of the recognition of the gain (or loss) is auto-
matic and mandatory, not elective, and reflects a quite different statutory
pattern. In any event, clarification of the Service's position should be
sought before proceeding in this area of collapsible corporation problems.
Xlll
CAPITAL GAINS PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS (cont'd)
DISPOSITIONS OF INVENTIONS (PATENTED AND UNPATENTED)
Bruce Griswold
Another important source of capital gains is the sale of inventions
and similar items. In an economy which stresses growth and advance-
ment in technology, this type of transaction is of increasing importance.
In the last ten years, the sale of patents and "know-how" items has re-
ceived increasingly favorable tax treatment, both judicially and adminis-
tratively.
The general rules applicable to the sale or transfer of property of this
type, a review of the special statutory tax treatment provided for the sale
of patents, and an examination of certain related considerations, problems
and pitfalls involved in these transactions, will be discussed in this article.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS DETERMINING WHETHER
THERE IS "PROPERTY" (e.g., IS AN UNPATENTED INVENTION
OR SECRET PROCESS "PROPERTY"?).
Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code defines a "capital asset"
as "property held by the taxpayer." Clearly, a patented invention consti-
tutes a property right,' and therefore, meets the "property" requirement
1. See also Bailey, The Inventor, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 285 (1957); Clark, Tax
Aspects of Operating Patents: Income from a License Agreement as Capital Gain or Ordinary
Income, PATENT LICENSING 91 (Practicing Law Institute 1958); Greenbaum, Tax Problems of
Authors and Inventors, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx 87 (1955); Taylor, How to Handle
Patents, Copyrights and Similar Interests, TAX IDEAS 5 5012 (P-H 1959); Zarky, Capital
Gain Concepts: What Is A "Capital" Asset? When Is There a "Sale or Exchange"?, U. So. CAL.
1959 TAx INST. 357, 394.
2. See, e.g., the discussion in Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544, 547-48 (1955).
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of this section. However, there are a number of specific situations in this
area in which the "property" requirement of section 1221 is not so dearly
met.
One such situation arises in the area of unpatented items, such as,
secret processes. The Government has claimed that the unpatented item
is not the property of the taxpayer and, therefore, does not meet the defi-
nition of a capital asset! While there is not a great deal of authority on
this problem, the lower courts have regularly ruled in favor of the tax-
payer, holding that unpatented items and secret processes are entitled to
capital gain treatment just as are patented inventions, and the Internal
Revenue Service has acquiesced in many of these decisions.4 Further, the
Tax Court has ruled that a taxpayer receives capital gain on the sale of
an invention where the sale took place prior to the filing of the patent
application as well as where the sale took place after the application had
been filed.' This same court has also accorded the same capital gain
treatment to sales of inventions and secret processes that were never
actually patented, at least in the United States.!
Another parallel situation arises where an invention or secret process
is unpatentable. It appears, in this area, that the courts make no distinc-
tion between a patentable item and an unpatentable one and afford the
latter the same capital gain treatment as the former.7 As one district
court has stated: "... one who discovers a secret process has certain rights
in his discovery even though it may not be patentable."'
A third situation concerns various business records and other "know-
how" items. The Service itself has established clarity in this area by
ruling that records regarding business, as well as intangible assets, such
as goodwill, are capital assets (except where the records are, in fact, in-
ventory) .° Further, the Service has recognized that the right to use man-
ufacturing "know-how" is in the nature of a property right, treating in-
come resulting from the licensing of such rights as royalty income under
the particular circumstances."0
3. See the discussion of government position in Hershey Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 867, 872-73
(1928).
4. See notes 5 and 6 infra.
5. See Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 265 (1946), acq., 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 6.
6. Franklin S. Speicher, 28 T.C. 938 (1957), acq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 7; George S. Me-
pham, 3 B.T.A. 549 (1926), acq., V-2 CUM. BuLL. 2 (1926).
7. See Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953).
8. Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 253 F.2d 43
(D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Lysbeth B. Huckins, CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (60-1
U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 9394 (S.D. Fla. April 1, 1960).
9. Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 CuM. BULL 370. The sale of insurance expirations results in cap.
ital gain. George J. Aitken, 35 T.C. No. 29 (Nov. 8, 1960).
10. Rev. Rul. 55-17, 1955-1 CuM BULL 338; cf. Lasell v. United States, CCH 1961 STAND.
FkD. TAX REP. (60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9681 (N.D. CaL Sept. 6, 1960).
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROPERTY IS A "CAPITAL ASSET"
Once it has been determined that an item is property, the next ques-
tion to be answered is whether that property constitutes a capital asset
within the requirements of section 1221. The general rules governing
this determination have been discussed previously." These general rules
apply in this particular field, but are subject to certain amplifications and
exceptions.
Except in special cases involving the sale of patents under section
1235, the character of the owner of the property is a vital factor in de-
termining whether property is a capital asset. The definition of a capital
asset in section 1221 specifically excludes a taxpayer's stock in trade, in-
ventory and property held primarily for sales to customers in the ordinary
course of business. Accordingly, sales of inventions by a professional in-
ventor have been held to result in ordinary income.'" Whether or not
an inventor is a professional or holds property as stock in trade or for
sales to customers is, of course, a factual issue. The most important fac-
tors seem to be the number and extent of the taxpayer's prior sales and
licenses of his patents, the relationship between the particular invention
sold and the taxpayer's other inventing activities and his employment,
and possibly the taxpayer's own characterization of his status.' The Gov-
ernment has lost many of these cases,'4 particularly where the inventor
had some other principal activity or had not previously engaged in the
sale or licensing of his inventions on a substantial scale.
The character of the property is also a factor in the tax treatment ac-
corded to sales of this type of item. Section 1221 excludes from the defi-
nition of a capital asset property used in trade or business of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation. Patents are depreci-
able property and accordingly, are excluded from the definition under
section 1221. However, section 1231 provides for capital gain treat-
ment on the sale of depreciable property at a gain and accordingly,
patents would be entitled to favorable treatment under section 1231 upon
sale. Patent applications are also probably depreciable, at least under cir-
cumstances where the facts establish an appropriate measure for the
11. See discussion pp. 256-66.
12. Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 539 (1942); Lockhart v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 343 (3d
Cir. 1958).
13. Beach v. Shaunhessy, 126 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.N.Y. 1951); Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 253 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Evans v. Kav-
anaugh, 86 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich 1949), alf'd, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951); Carl G.
Dreyman, 11 T.C. 153 (1948), acq., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 2, nonacq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 5;
Harold F. Silver, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 489 (1956); John W. Hogg, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
212 (1944); cf. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
774 (1944).
14. See, e.g., Pike v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1951).
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amount of the depreciation deduction (such as an annual payment meas-
ured by the return on the invention)."5
DETERMINING WHETHER THERE IS A "SALE OR EXCHANGE"
UNDER SECTION 1221 AND 1222 (OR SECTION 1231)
The general rules applicable to determining whether a transaction
constitutes a sale or exchange have been discussed in a preceding sec-
tion.'" The discussion here is confined to a review of the problems en-
countered in connection with the transfer of intangible property, particu-
larly patents. Transfers of patent interests have taken many varied forms
covering all kinds of terms and provisions. The actual terms in a par-
ticular licensing or sales agreement and various unusual circumstances
surrounding the transaction have presented problems in determining the
exact nature of the transfer.
Three basic types of problems have arisen in the transfer of patent
or similar interests. First, in many instances the transferor of a patent
interest has retained administrative and security rights and in many cases
has also retained commercial rights of great or speculative value. The
retention of rights has, of course, led to the question: Does the particular
transaction constitute a sale or something less than a sale? No general
rule can be given as to the results in these cases since each one depends
on the particular facts and the Government has, therefore, had varying
degrees of success in its effort to obtain a decision that a given transaction
was a license rather than a sale. Secondly, transfers have been made to
corporations in which the transferor (and/or his family) had a substan-
tial or controlling interest. The Government has contended that, be-
cause of the circumstances surrounding the disposition and the rights
which the transferor had in the acquiring corporation, there was no sale.
Here, however, the Government has been unsuccessful in its efforts to
have the transfer held a license rather than a sale (assuming, of course,
that the other criteria of a sale of a capital asset were present). Thirdly,
sales of patents have been made on terms which did not set a specific pur-
chase price for the patent. Rather, the return to the transferor was meas-
ured by sales of the patented article or the productivity of the patent.
Here again, the Government has generally been unsuccessful. A more
15. Best Lock Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959); Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.C. 979 (1945);
Century Tank Mfg. Co., 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 430 (1959) (Taxpayer got depreciation
based on amount of annual payment for purchase of application); Associated Patentees, Inc.,
2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 718 (1943). But cf. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 58-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 5 9305 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (Application has no definite period of useful life); Borg
& Beck Co., 24 B.T.A. 995 (1931), acq., XI-1 CUM. BULL. 2 (1932); Hershey Mfg. Co. 14
B.T.A. 867 (1928), nonacq., VIII-2 CuM. BULL. 64 (1929), af'd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.
1930).
16. See discussion pp. 253-55.
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detailed discussion of the problems in this field and of some of the repre-
sentative cases gives some guideposts to the application of these rules.
Retention of Rights in Transferred Patent
In these cases involving a disposition of less than all the rights to a
patent, the tax treatment will depend on whether the court finds that
there was a license or a sale for tax purposes. In viewing a transaction or
a series of related transactions, the court, pursuant to the well-recognized
step-transaction doctrine, will examine all of the various agreements in-
volved, including transfers of any rights back to the transferor, in order
to determine what rights were retained and whether or not this retention
precludes treatment of the transaction as a sale." However, the designa-
tion of a transfer as a license is not necessarily conclusive, since an exclu-
sive license of the right to make, use and sell has been treated as an as-
signment of the patent and thus as a sale for tax as well as other pur-
poses.18
Case law on this problem does not present a uniform pattern or pro-
vide rules for determining with any certainty the treatment of every par-
ticular arrangement. Even prior to the enactment of the special statutory
provision on the sale of patents in the 1950's, 9 there was case law to the
effect that a sale took place where all substantial rights to a patent were
transferred."0 Other cases held that the transferor had to transfer all
three of the basic patent rights, i.e., the rights to make, use and sell, and
transfer them to the transferee exclusively or the transfer was a license
and did not convey the patent itself.2" Other cases by contrast permitted
the seller to retain (or receive a license back for) certain valuable rights
and the transaction was still treated as a sale with capital gain to the
transferor.2"
For convenience in analysis, the rights that have been retained in
transactions of this type may be generally grouped into administrative
rights and commercial rights. So far as the retention of administrative
rights is concerned, the courts have generally treated a transfer as a sale
even though the transferor retained the right to approve the licensing of
17. Watkins v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 722
(2d Cir. 1958).
18. Waterman v. McKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th
Cir. 1951); Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, CCH TAx CT. REP. (CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) No. 146
(June 6, 1960).
19. See discussion pp. 355-57.
20. Parke, Davis & Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934), acq., XIV-1 CuM. BULL. 15 (1935).
21. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 10 T.C. 974 (1948), afd without opinion, 177 F.2d
200 (6th Cir. 1949); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183, 190 (1947).
22. See notes 23-31 infra.
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third partiest to veto the granting of sublicenses, 4 or to terminate the
agreement for breach of contract or insolvency on the part of the trans-
feree. 5 The Government has been quite unsuccessful in attempts to
negate a sale where the transferor retained rights to protect his interest
in the proceeds of sale.
In cases involving commercial rights, a division of the rights to man-
ufacture, use and sell has occasionally been made (the transferor retain-
ing or receiving back a license to manufacture, use or sell) and such a
transaction has generally been treated as a sale.2" In certain of these cases
the right that was retained was apparently of no significance to the
parties as a matter of fact, while in other cases the right was probably val-
uable. In one case the patentee sold one of several inventions covered
by a single patent and received capital gain treatment.27 In other cases
the transferor retained a right to terminate the agreement under certain
circumstances, and this did not preclude capital gain treatment.28 How-
ever, where the rights of termination in the transferor have permitted
him a more or less unlimited right to terminate prior to the expiration
of the life of a patent, the transfer has been held not to be a sale. 9
Further, a grant of rights which has been limited geographically has been
considered as entitled to capital gain treatment."0 Likewise, the grant of
rights to a patent where the grant was limited to a particular industry has
received capital gain treatment, though in at least one instance, the patent
involved was apparently of little or no value in any other industry.!' Cau-
tion should be exercised in this field as capital gain treatment in this type
of transfer has been limited in at least one case to a situation where the
23. Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 253 F.2d
43 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24. Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1957).
25. Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958), affirming 155 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.
Pa. 1957).
26. Lawrence v. United States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957) (transferor failed to transfer
right to sell - sales not planned); Massey v. United States, 226 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1955);
Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (subsequent license back of right to
use after three year interval); Evans v. Kavanaugh, 86 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1949), aff'd,
188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951) (transferor retained the right to use invention and assign it to
one other person); Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138 (1956), acq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 6 (trans-
feror retained right to use apparatus embodying invention in consulting work); Parke, Davis
& Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934), acq., XIV-1 CUM. BULL. 15 (1935) (transferor granted no
right to sell). But ef. Watkins v. United States, 252 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1958).
27. Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958), affirming 155 F. Supp. 843 (ED.
Pa. 1957).
28. Roy J. Campayne, 26 T.C. 634 (1956), acq., 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 2; Edward C. Myers,
6 T.C. 258, 265 (1946), acq., 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 6.
29. Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953); Lynne Gregg, 18 T.C. 291 (1952),
gff'd per curiam, 203 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1953), acq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
30. Crook v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 242 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
31. United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955); First NaeI Bank v. United
States, 136 F. Supjp. 818 (D.NJ. 1956).
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rights in the industries retained were of little or highly speculative
value.
8 2
Sale to Related Corporation
Many cases have involved situations where the transferor has con-
veyed his patent interests to a corporation in which he or his family have
substantial or controlling interests. The courts have generally sustained
the taxpayer's position that such a transaction, if it meets the other re-
quirements, does constitute the sale of a capital asset."8
In any transfer of this kind, the transferor must not forget the pos-
sible application of section 1239 to the sale and the consequent ordinary
income treatment as a result of the sale if that statute applies.
Form of Payment for the Patent
The type of payment made for the transfer of the patent has been
the source of much litigation in this area. Where the taxpayer is en-
titled to receive something other than a lump sum payment, the Govern-
ment has argued that there has not been a sale.34 For many years it took
the position that in effect the transferor was receiving royalties under a
license and was not entitled to capital gain treatment. However, this po-
sition has shifted and presently the Service recognizes that the mere re-
tention by the transferor of an interest resembling a royalty in a transac-
tion which is otherwise a sale, does not prevent capital gain treatment for
the transferor.85
Determining the Holding Period
Determining the holding period of an invention presents certain
problems. The general rule is that the holding period of an invention
starts when it has been actually reduced to practice upon completion of
a working pilot model. The holding period terminates upon the entry
into a binding commitment for the transfer of the patent (even though
32. American Chem. Paint Co. v. Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
33. Sheen v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Pa. 1958); H. C. Johnson, 30 T.C. 675
(1958); Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957), acq., 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 4; John T. Potter,
27 T.C. 200 (1957), acq., 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 6; Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, CCH TAX CT.
REP. (CCH Tax Ct. Mem.) No. 146 (June 6, 1960). See also Gruber v. United States, 158
F. Supp. 510 (D. Ore. 1958), rev'd sub. nom. Mayer v. United States, CCH 1961 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 9147 (Dec. 9, 1960).
34. See Government's argument in these cases: Commissioner v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d
339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1942).
35. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 408, revoking Mim. 6490. 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 9,
and Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 97; T.I.R. No. 81, 6 CCH 1958 ST. & FED. TAX REP.
3 6583; Leonard Coplan 28 T.C. 1189 (1957), acq., 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 4; Edward C. Myers,
6 T.C. 258 (1946), acq., 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 6.
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the actual payment or the transfer itself is postponed)." Special prob-
lems arise in connection with the determination of the holding period of
an employee-inventor who is required by his employment contract to as-
sign any invention to his employer and the same problems are presented
in connection with any form of agreement where the inventor is required
to assign improvement patents."7
SPECIAL STATUTORY RULES PROVIDING FOR CAPITAL GAIN
TREATMENT UPON SALE OF A PATENT UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES
Section 1235 was added to the Code in the 1950's to provide special
treatment for the sale of a patent in cases where its provisions are appli-
cable. It was intended to stimulate inventors and to encourage invention
by granting favorable tax treatment both to inventors and to certain in-
dividuals who grant financial support to an inventor prior to the reduc-
tion of his invention to practice.
It should be emphasized that section 1235 does not provide an exclu-
sive means for an individual to realize capital gain on the sale of a patent.
Depending upon the facts, the transferor may find it more advantageous
to attempt to work out a transaction meeting the rules discussed above
rather than the requirements of section 1235. However, although sec-
tion 1235 does not refer to the sale of intangibles other than patents and
patent applications, its rules are more definite than those discussed above.
Section 1235 applies to the transfer: (a) of "all substantial rights"
(b) to a patent (or an undivided interest therein) or (c) to a patent ap-
plication by an individual inventor or by any other "holder" defined as an
individual who is his financial backer (excluding the inventor's em-
ployer, any related party and, of course, any corporation)." This section
applies to a transfer even though the consideration for the conveyance is
payable periodically over the period of use of the patent or is contingent
upon the productivity, use or disposition of the patent, i.e., even though
the payments resemble royalties, in effect. Thus, the statutory provisions
have eliminated one of the primary tax problems which frequently arose
in this type of transaction where the sale of a patent was made in return
for a payment based on the productivity of the patent. The statutory pro-
36. Paul L Kusmick, 11 T.C. 288 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3; Samuel B. Diescher,
36 B.T.A. 732 (1937), afld, 110 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1940), acq., 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 189;
G.C.M. 21507, 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 189; I.T. 3310, 1939-2 Ctm. BULL. 190.
37. See Paul L. Kusmick, 11 T.C. 288, 297 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
38. Quacre, does "patent" in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235 include an invention (1)
where patent is issued later? (2) which is never patented? (3) where patent application
is dismissed or dropped? Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2 (a) states that "it is not necessary that the
patent or patent application for the invention be in existence if the requirements of § 1235
are otherwise met." (Hereinafter cited as Reg.) See also S. REB. No. 1622, 83d Con&, 2d
Sess. 439 (1954).
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visions have removed the possibility, as to qualifying transactions, that
the Government can successfully claim a transaction is not a sale because
the payments are so contingent.
Transfers to certain related persons do not come within the coverage
of the statute and the definition of related person includes the spouse, an-
cestors and descendants of the inventor, as well as any corporation in
which the interest of the inventor or his family is twenty-five per cent or
more. Here again, the treatment of a transaction under section 1235 is
in marked contrast to the treatment of transactions involving sales by an
inventor to a related corporation under the case law discussed above. As
has been stated, the courts have recognized as sales the transfer of a patent
to a corporation in which the inventor and his family have held a sub-
stantial or controlling interest. 9 Under section 1235, this possibility is
limited to a case where the inventor and his family own less than twenty-
five per cent of the corporation's outstanding stock.
The provisions of section 1235 are also in striking contrast to the re-
sults under prior law in two other particulars. If the other requirements
are met, section 1235 will apply to the transfer of a patent even though
the inventor's holding period is less than six months, and even though the
sale is by a professional inventor or by an individual who is in the busi-
ness of buying and selling patents40
Problem: What Are "fAll Substantial Rights"?
One major problem under section 1235 arises out of the requirement
that tall substantial rights" to a patent must be transferred if the transac-
tion is to qualify under the section. As has been indicated, problems
have arisen in an attempt to determine what constitutes a sale where the
transferor has retained various rights. So far as section 1235 is con-
cerned, the Regulations state that the words "all substantial rights" mean
"all rights which are of value at the time the rights to the patent are
transferred.""' The Regulations give examples of what may be retained
and what must not be retained. For example, the transferor ordinarily
may retain administrative rights, such as nominal legal title to secure per-
formance or payment of the amounts due.4" He may retain a security
interest, such as a vendor's lien or right to terminate the arrangement
upon default by the transferee.4" So far as the retention of commercial
39. Cf. cases such as Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957), acq., 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 4
where there was a sale to family business outside § 1235.
40. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d) (3).
41. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b). See also summary set forth above in the discussion of case law and
in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
42. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (2) (i).
43. Reg. § 1.1235(b) (2) (ii).
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rights is concerned, the Regulations state that the transferor should not
retain the right to terminate the license at will nor the sole right to sue
for infringement.44 The license must be exclusive for the life of the
patent or for its remaining term.45 Further, the Regulations state that the
transferor, depending on the circumstances, may retain the right to use or
sell the patent property but this right should certainly be exercised with
extreme caution in view of the case law on this subject and the require-
ments that "all substantial rights" be transferred.4 It is probable that
prior case law to the effect that the transferor may secure capital gain
treatment upon the transfer of rights to a particular industry is applicable
under section 1235, particularly if the retained rights are of no commer-
cial value or are only of speculative value.4 Also, the existence of a
shop right in an employer does not preclude the sale of "all substantial
rights" by the employee.5 8
Amounts received from the sale of an option to acquire a patent, if
the transaction entered into in granting the license qualifies under section
1235, results in capital gain when the option is exercised and in ordinary
income if and when the option lapses.49
GAIN ON SALE OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY BETWEEN CERTAIN
RELATED PARTIES IS ORDINARY INCOME
A 1951 amendment to the Code added an important provision which
is of vital consideration in all transactions of this type as well as in many
other transactions. Section 1239 now provides that any gain which is
recognized upon the sale of depreciable property between certain related
parties is treated as ordinary income. This rule has broad application to
sales and exchanges of all kinds of depreciable property. Related parties
are defined in this section as follows: "Husband and wife or an indi-
vidual and a corporation where eighty per cent of the corporation's out-
standing stock is owned by the seller, his spouse and his minor children
and grandchildren." This section dearly seems to apply to the sale of a
patent."0 Therefore, the provisions of section 1239 are an important
limitation upon and a vital consideration in any sale or exchange of a
44. Reg. S 1.1235-2(b) (4); Arthur M. Young, 29 T.C. 850 (1958), affd, 269 F.2d 89
(2d Cir. 1959).
45. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1), (c).
46. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (3) (i); Storm v. United States, 243 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1957).
47. United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955); Estate of Milton P. Laurent,
34 T.C. No. 38 (May 31, 1960).
48. H. Jordan, 27 T.C. 265 (1956), acq., 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
49. Rev. Rul. 57-49, 1957-1 CUm. BULL. 266.
50. Kershaw v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 415 (Ct. Cl. 1960). This applies to patents.
Royce Kershaw, 34 T.C. No. 44 (June 8, 1960) (same issue and same holding but as to
different tax years).
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patent (or any other depreciable property), by an individual to his
spouse or to his controlled corporation. The disastrous consequences
which the statute may bring upon a taxable incorporation, a taxable ex-
change, or a sale are illustrated by a recent Revenue Ruling and a recent
Tax Court case.5
RELATED PROBLEMS INVOLVING POSSIBILITY OF RECEIPT OF
ORDINARY INCOME RATHER THAN CAPITAL GAIN
Very frequently, assets, such as patents, goodwill or other intangibles
are sold and as part of the sale the seller gives the buyer a covenant that
he will not compete with the buyer or agrees to perform personal services
for the buyer. The distribution of the asset, coupled with such an agree-
ment, presents the possibility that a portion of the amounts paid to the
seller may be ordinary income on the ground that such payment was
made for the covenant not to compete or for the agreement to perform
services. This aspect of these transactions also has important tax conse-
quences to the buyer, as well as to the seller, since the buyer will be en-
titled to a deduction for payments for services or for a covenant not to
compete under certain conditions. An examination of the rules that have
developed will help determine the treatment of any given transaction.
Disposition of the Asset, Coupled with Covenant Not To Compete,
When an Asset is Sold
The tax treatment of the payments made to the seller will depend
upon the fundamental nature of the transaction. The courts have held
that a covenant not to compete, which is primarily to secure to the pur-
chaser of an asset the beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill and is, in ef-
fect, a contributing element to the assets being purchased, is a non-sever-
able part of the asset transferred and therefore, the payment for the
covenant results in capital gain to the seller. Thus, in the sale of a news-
paper business where the court found that the contract was not divisible
even though a portion of the purchase price was allocated to the covenant,
the seller was held entitled to capital gain since the price paid for the
going business and intangibles associated with the business, included both
control and the covenant not to compete.5" The buyer on the same facts
was denied a deduction for payments for the covenant, again on the
ground that it was not a severable transaction."
51. William L. Ainsworth, 1961 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. (60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5
9595 (E.D. Wis. June 21, 1960); Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960 INT. REV. BULL. No. 38, at 10.
52. Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943), acq., 1944 CUM. BULL. 28. See also Ray H.
Schulz, 34 T.C. No. 27 (May 19, 1960); Harry Shwartz, CCH TAX CT. REP. (CCH Tax Ct.
Mem.) No. 288 (Oct. 27, 1960).
53. Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd without opinion, 180 F.2d 357 (6th
Cit. 1950).
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On the other hand, where the payment for the covenant not to com-
pete is a severable and a separate item in the transaction, is specifically
bargained for, has been evaluated and has stated consideration which is
reasonable under the circumstances, payment for the covenant is ordinary
income to the seller.54 Correspondingly, the buyer gets an amortization
deduction for the amount paid for the covenant under these circum-
stances.
55
Disposition of the Asset, Coupled with Agreement
to Perform Services
Frequently, the seller of the asset agrees to perform services after the
sale has been completed. The nature of these services varies. Problems
arise because the two transactions (the sale of the asset and the furnishing
of services) are linked together and the Internal Revenue Service may al-
locate the consideration and payments differently than do the parties.
For example, an inventor may be required to render services as part of
the consideration for the assignment of the patent. He may not be able
to prove that the payments made were for the sale of the patent and he
may be required to allocate a portion of the payment he received to ordi-
nary income for services.
The following summary gives the basis for distinguishing between
those cases where the entire payment is treated as capital gain and those
cases where some allocation is made to personal services. The entire pay-
ment is treated as payment for the capital asset where the services to be
rendered are ancillary and subsidiary to the sale of the patent and of the
type usually called for to implement the sale of a patent. On the other
hand, where the services are to be rendered in making further develop-
ments and improvements in the field of the invention sold, the payment
for services will be ordinary income.55
The courts in each situation have reviewed the contract terms care-
fully to see if there is any allocation which can be inferred from the man-
ner in which payments are handled. For example, a percentage payment
which is reduced when the seller is no longer active in the business dearly
indicates that the excess percentage payment was made in return for ser-
vices, rather than for the purchase of the asset.57
54. See also Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cit. 1954); R. Ullman,
29 T.C. 129 (1957), afPd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959); G. H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954),
acq., 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 5; A. Alichaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
55. See Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cit. 1954).
56. See Spence v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 556 (Ct. CL 1957); Gilbert M. Wright, 57-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9419 (S.D. Cal. 1957). See also R. M. Hessert, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1190
(1947); William R. Ost, CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 80 (1958); Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138
(1956), acq., 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 57.
57. Spence v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 556 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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